The usual first thought about strategic quick reaction forces is nowadays about American-style gold plating: Air-deployable forces that fit into gold-plated transport aircraft and deploy within days. This fits to a country that need little military because it has no threats on its own or a connected continent and meddles primarily on distant continents. It's obviously unsuited to the defence of Europe, save for quickly deploying defences for some Mediterranean islands.
The quickest administrative march within a few thousand kilometres with no early notice is nowadays the road march with wheeled vehicles that approach the cruise speed and reliability of commercial heavy lorries.
Tracked vehicles should march long distances on a flatbed waggon or on a dedicated flatbed semi-trailer. It takes time to load and unload the train, but repairs of broken-down vehicles and worn parts tend to take even longer. The train itself can travel quicker than lorries on motorways, but loading and unloading are important fixed (time) costs and the railway network is much more susceptible to sabotage and attack than the road network.
In the end, it's reasonable to expect most if not all tracked vehicles to arrive later than the wheeled vehicles for a deployment such as from Germany to Lithuania, for example.
Doctrine and force developers did not yet create any truly optimised answer to this two times of arrival problem.
Example: The German Division Eingreifkräfte has two manoeuvre brigades; a Panzerbrigade and a Panzergrenadierbrigade - the latter is identical to the first except no Panzerbataillon (no MBTs). These brigades would be ready for employment only once at least one brigade and much of the division's support troops arrived.
A different approach that would allow for a quicker readiness for action at the Polish-Lithuanian border would consist of one component capable of a very quick road march with no early notice (wheeled vehicles and few tracked vehicles on wheeled semi-trailers) and another component meant for deployment by rail* if the march distance exceeds about 500 km.
The "'wheeled' component would need to have limited combat readiness at least - for defensive actions and infantry-based offensive actions in cluttered terrain. A brigade with two infantry battalions could have one equipped with armoured combat vehicles (such as APCs, HAPCs, even if need be IFVs) yet still deploy it at first with lorries. The other could use wheeled all wheel drive APCs. The result would be two infantry battalions and the brigade's artillery (possibly tracked SPGs hauled on semi-trailers) available for action before the bulk of tracked vehicles arrive. Thee would be hardly any downside to this in case of a timely deployment of the whole brigade, since the only requirement would be a few dozen more lorries including about 18 70 ton semi-trailer lorries.
The bigger problem for the gain of maybe one or two days in face of disrupted rail traffic would be he doctrine side: The brigade would need to know two doctrines; one with tracked armoured combat vehicles and one without them (with a smaller tactical repertoire). These two should be mastered anyway, though: One can expect the AFVs to dwindle away during days or weeks of action, with little or no replacements arriving. The infantry may (will) melt away as well, so the brigade should know a mode of operation in which the duel (line-of-sight) forces provide little more than pickets and the (hopefully survivable) artillery keeps hammering while evading line-of-sight contacts.
I wrote about strategic QRF here because I'm convinced that the rapidity, not the size, of forces is the key metric for deterrence value against a Russian coup de main in the Baltic and such a coup de main is the only plausible scenario for collective deterrence and defence in Europe today. All other collective deterrence and defence scenarios would be negligible in either probability (nuclear war etc.) or scope (such as the irritations at the Turkish-Syrian border).
Years if not decades have been spent elaborating about quick deployment forces and professional journals have published hundreds of articles about airlift of combat vehicles, but none of this was of great relevance to the only truly noble purpose of European military power: Deterrence and defence or collective security in Europe.
The current Turkish campaign against the PKK and as a fig leaf against D'aesh repeats a hint already given by other entanglements in the chaotic MidEast.
Let's assume that U.S. and/or EU approval for the Turkish actions against the PKK was required. This assumption is basically the assumption that great powers still hold great power over small powers.
The Turkish government exploited the U.S. interest in hurting D'aesh (including use of Turkish air bases) to create a situation in which the combination of Turkish reignition of their pointless civil war against a faction of the Kurds (this time for domestic political power gaming) is tolerable because it's offered as a package with anti-D'aesh measures. The latter come at almost no expense for the Turkish government, and direct Turkish efforts against D'aesh were minimal and largely temporary. Still, the Turkish government packaged one evil with partisanship and thus recreated what we've seen a lot during the Cold War already, when Western powers backed many tyrants because they pledged to be "anti-communist": The Western great powers look away.
This shows how sometimes and maybe very often the "influence" of great power can only improve the world if said great power stays neutral instead of committed to hostilities to some ideology, bloc, country or organisation. They can be cynically played by small powers once they become committed and thus partisan.
The typical writings about the German army on the Eastern front at the end of 1941 focus on the harsh winter weather and insufficient winter equipment (clothing, lubricants, skis).
There was much more of interest, and of greater consequence, and I'm motivated to write a list of pointers for those interested in military history:
(1) Loss of mobility
Horses were still the No1 means of moving supplies and artillery pieces in 1941-1945 in the German army. According to different sources 600,000-750,000 horses were used by German forces on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941.
Infantry divisions had lorry units to move supplies between railheads and the division, but horse carts hauled the supplies from the division's supply points and carried them till their consumption.
The horses were fed inadequately with oat because supply with oat was very demanding (large volume) and distances to railheads (incompatible rail lines) were often great. Most horses became exhausted within weeks.
Great many draught horses were lost during OP Barbarossa and had to be replaced with Eastern European horses; hardy, lighter - and weaker. Many smaller, lighter carts had to be used to match these different horses, and the quantity of drivers required rose.
I didn't find statistics on German horse losses during 1941 alone, but apparently 179,600 horses died mostly due to cold and hunger from 1st December 1941 to 15h March 1942, with only 20,000 replacements during this period. Replacements arrived later till May, but 60,000 replacement horses arrived in poor shape after long land marches during winter time and 118,000 horses were commandeered in Eastern Europe - almost all of them more hardy, yet also weaker. They were useless as draught horses for artillery pieces and the German standard heavy steel frame wagons.
Light motorcycles excelled in pre-war competitions employed by skilled drivers for a few hours, but within weeks of OP Barbarossa's start the light motorcycles had proved to be failures in army use. Many civilian motorcycles were lost as well, and only the expensive heavy military motorcycle types (mostly used with sidecars) were judged to be really robust. Their losses were severe because of their use by combat and reconnaissance troops, though.
Within the first five weeks 9,100 motorcycles were lost, yet only 606 were replaced with production or captured vehicles. The motorcycle rifle troops (Kradschützen) that had added crucial infantry support to tanks and motorised reconnaissance troops were ruined quickly.
Later on the nominal motorcycle strength (mostly for messengers) of infantry divisions was reduced to cope with the shortages, but the motorized infantry had to be converted to trucks and would receive substantial quantities of protected half-tracks only after 1942. The successful 1939-1941 model of fully motorized divisions combined arms combat had to change and adapt.
The German army was mostly using civilian cars. They were hardly ever used for combat or reconnaissance roles anyway, so a reliable car for marches on unpaved roads was adequate. The use of civilian cars led to a horrible range of vehicles serving next to each other in a division. The repair shops could not possibly have adequate spare parts for these vehicles. Furthermore, many cars proved to be inadequate under the harsh conditions of the Eastern Front.
The Heer lost 21,559 cars during the first six months of OP Barbarossa, but production was a mere 3,089 cars. The losses were replaced with commandeered used civilian cars, which mostly represents a loss in quality.
Many light and medium lorry types - Ford lorries with two-stroke engines, Czech lorries of all kinds etc. were found wanting if not entirely useless under the conditions of the Eastern Front. Attrition was severe by crashes, wear and combat actions.
The Heer lost 36,189 lorries during the first six months of OB Barbarossa, but production was a mere 12,139 lorries. Only 4,913 Soviet lorries (mostly light ones) were captured. Again, commandeered used civilian trucks had to be used.
(2) Anti-tank inadequacies
About half of Soviet tank production were still light tanks that could be defeated with a 37 mm gun, but those were mostly attached to rifle divisions and similar formations of the line. The mechanised formations for the main effort actions were (also) equipped with T-34 and KV-1 tanks. Adequate guns and munitions for their defeat were introduced in substantial quantities during 1942, but still in inadequate supply during the summer of 1943. The problem was in part that due to a tungsten production shortage Germany had to limit tungsten largely to tools production for metal works. Without tungsten projectiles the range of 2.8, 4.2 and 7.5 cm squeezebore anti-tank guns became useless. The tungsten could not be replaced with in their projectiles because the whole point of these guns was to have the penetrator impact at very high velocity (~1,200 m/s). Steel penetrators shattered when impacting on hardened steel plates at such velocities. New, conventional anti-tank guns of adequate power had to be introduced, and later on shaped charge munitions arrived especially for the infantry and stub guns.
(3) Infantry weakness
Infantry casualties were severe in Russia. German infantry divisions had a replacement battalion for training, but they would have needed a replacement regiment to sate their need for qualified infantrymen. This wasn't feasible for lack of trainers even if it had been attempted. Another problem was that the politically well-connected (Göring) Luftwaffe drew unnecessarily large quantities of young, potential infantrymen conscripts and did put them into poor use (such as air observers in France). The Waffen-SS's recruiting of particularly fit young men and subsequent waste by inappropriately aggressive tactics was another problem.
The German infantry strength on the Eastern Front of 1942 was approximately half of what had been available there in 1941.
(4) Armoured reconnaissance
The skilful employment of fully motorized divisions requires sufficient reconnaissance. The divisional armoured reconnaissance troops were meant to deliver this, but they depended on few armoured cars that were not very suitable for Eastern European terrain and on motorcycle infantry troops. Light (4x4) armoured cars were a disappointment on the Eastern Front and heavy ones (8x8) were astonishingly expensive. Some reconnaissance detachments were down to 11% of armoured cars and 50% of soft-skinned vehicles by November 1941.
Reconnaissance detachments of fully motorised divisions would later (about 1943) receive cost-effective light half-track vehicles for the Eastern Front, but at the end of 1941 and during 1942 their capabilities were very much reduced because of high attrition rates (when employed) and a shortage of suitable vehicles.
(5) Junior leadership
Officers from 2nd lieutenant (Leutnant) to captain (Hauptmann) faced severe attrition rates (life expectancy at the front measured in weeks) because they frequently led their troops instead of directing them from behind. Higher officers did the same, but much less often. The high attrition rates led to less experienced junior leadership and thus less skilful junior leadership. Officers who had seen Poland, France and months of OP Barbarossa were replaced by lieutenants with little leadership experience, if any substantial combat experience at all.
(6) Air support
Quality and quantity of air support was dropping as well due to attrition rates and demands of other theatres of war. The Luftwaffe's shortage of aircraft mechanics was severe.
Meanwhile the Soviets were in the process of replacing lost biplanes with relatively modern monoplanes. The red air force was not considered to be a very important influence on the war in Russia until 1943 or even 1944 by German post-war authors, but the dwindling of German air power made Soviet administrative marches safer and quicker, and less often helped the German troops to overcome stiff resistance during advances.
Summary: The German army that emerged after the spring rasputitsa of 1942 wasn't merely mauled by winter and the Soviet winter offensive; it had lost during the summer and autumn of 1941 what made it such an effective tool of warfare in the summer of 1941 and it was to never fully solve the problem of anti-tank defence in regard to quality and quantity at the same time. It had been blunted by the severity of combat, the harsh logistical conditions (rail lines first needed to be converted, roads were unpaved, dust damaged engines which had inadequate air filters) and the harsh winter climate.
This historical episode is still interesting as a potential analogy for the future because Western land forces didn't need to adapt to such circumstances during the Cold War of later, and would thus suffer from similar problems. We could trust our automotive industries to supply enough suitable vehicles as the well-developed American one did during WW2 already and horses have lost relevance, but the inability to maintain the proficiency of combat and reconnaissance troops and their junior leadership ranks in a demanding conflict with severe casualty rates is all but guaranteed. The weak infantry component of Western army brigades could be ruined within days of campaigning against a peer force. It's reasonable to expect a typical Western army brigade to be blunted by severe attrition of key equipment (such as radars, AFVs), reconnaissance troops and combat troops within a week or two, and return as a skeleton of support troops and soft-skinned vehicles for (slow) rebuilding. We might also see again what happened to American divisions in 1944: Inadequately trained support troops pressed into infantry units to compensate severe attrition.
Camouflage uniforms for armies are a complex topic, but air force uniforms are a simple thing: A monocolour greenish, brownish or greyish uniform would be suitable, with only their dedicated security units equipped with army uniforms.
Navy uniform patterns are neither a particularly tricky nor particularly simple topic, but they have a huge potential for nonsense. Have a look at today's fashion for sailor uniforms:
These are about the worst possible colours for sailors serving onboard warships. Sure, they do hide minor stains by hydraulic fluids and the like, and don't signal a revival of the "spit and polish school" (laudable "no shine" boot option). Still, this pattern is the last you'd want to wear when you've gone overboard. This is how people look like who pay attention to safety at sea:
The materials aren't appropriate for a general issue uniform, but take a hint from the colour: A man in the water should have orange on top, not some camouflage pattern that works only to hide a man in the water and absolutely nowhere else. The material should be fire retarding for personnel on ships.
The general issue uniform could have this orange without looking orange all the time (too annoying). Assuming an inflatable life vest in orange is worn, one would only need an orange hoodie that could be hidden most of the time.
The rest of the uniform should remind the sailor that (s)he's a combatant and could be called upon in a land campaign to run rear area checkpoints, POW handling. point security for bridges, railroads or airfields et cetera. A greyish, brownish or blueish colour (possibly coupled with black) would work as satisfactorily as for an air force.
P.S.: Plenty warships have been hit badly and sunk during routine activities, unaware of the coming disaster. Extra immersion suits for navy personnel on board of warships are fine, but no excuse for a 180° wrong basic uniform colour palette.
Here's a bit of context: The German constitution allows the employment of the German military exclusively for purposes mentioned in the constitution expressly (the German constitutional court did bend this beyond recognition in 1999 to include the bombing of Yugoslavia).
My assumption is the minister wants to employ the offensive 'cyber warfare' capability and she does not want to be in trouble for blatantly violating the constitution.
Does it make sense to include 'cyber warfare' capabilities in the Bundeswehr in light of this assumption and the constitutional restrictions on employment of the German military?
Not for someone who wants the German federal government to work well, and this is independent of the questions whether offensive 'cyber warfare' makes sense or whether public servants or soldiers are the correct personnel for the job.
The intent to create offensive 'cyber warfare' capabilities in the Bundeswehr (or otherwise under MoD control) doesn't make sense to someone who wants good governance, for it wouldn't be good governance. It makes a lot of sense if we consider the top of the German MoD as a bunch of selfish individuals not optimizing public benefits, but maximizing their power, prestige, toy arsenal, budget, personnel strength, media attention and political profile.
A common case in favour of the size of arguments goes like "bad things would happen (more likely) if the budget was smaller". This makes sense with expenses such as for seawalls, but it always depends on assumptions rather than forces of nature when applied to military budgets.
The current discussions about what conditions Greece has to meet to get more money of other people for its needs provide yet another natural experiment (or anecdote) on the necessary size of military budgets.
One of the conditions is that Greece shall reduce its military budget that - by current definitions - is still one of the very highest in terms of "% GDP" in both NATO and the EU (see page six here). Obviously, the NATO and EU allies of Greece are convinced it's spending more than necessary.
The recent Greek counter-offer includes a reduction among many, many much more unpopular things - but the reduction is much smaller than previously noted as condition. This is incredible. Politicians who were elected to fight unpopular conditions, who fought to the bone for months against said unpopular conditions, who recently got a strong popular majority support in a plebiscite against the said unpopular conditions now offer to largely accept said unpopular conditions. They partially do so in preference over cutting the military budget a bit more. Meanwhile, their country is a member in the two most powerful military alliances mankind has ever seen, including three and two nuclear powers respectively.
Military budgets are not necessarily set wisely and are not necessarily a proportional response to a real threat situation or the potential for future threats. The reason for high military spending in a country may just as well be primitive politics and a preference of interest groups (especially insiders at the top) in favour of high spending. The prejudice that the existing spending level is necessary for national (or collective) security is thus invalid.
The power of this prejudice doesn't come across when I mention it because I don't have that fever in myself. It is a very, very powerful prejudice, though. It makes people claim that Europe couldn't fight its way out of a wet paper bag, doesn't spend much on military power, would be unable to defend itself, would depend on American military power as the central response to any peripheral military challenge.
The reality is that there's hardly any military threat. Even Russia is actually vastly inferior in conventional military terms and faces a double mutually assured destruction deterrence with France and the UK. Russia's conventional military weakness was confirmed by the events in and around the Ukraine, but due to the prejudice almost all interested people appear to draw the opposite conclusion from the events.
I wrote repeatedly (during the last eight years) about how both world wars and many wars in general were preceded by two or three years of intense arms racing. Long, sustained arms races rarely end in wars without such a final sprint.
The final arms race prior to the First World War began when the German parliament finally authorized an expansion of German land power in response to many years of great and sustained French and Russian efforts to create and maintain greater land power.
The final arms race prior to the Second World War in Europe began slowly in 1935 and accelerated considerably in 1938.
Now we could ask ourselves whether the refreshed interest in main battle tanks, in deployment and other exercises in Eastern Europe or maybe the gazillionth post-Cold War military reform in Russia may signal the start of another such horribly fateful arms race.
The statistical indicators won't be available until the next budget laws are passed, but I suppose no - this is not a final two-year or three-year dash into another great war. Using an analogy from the early 20th century, I'd rate the crisis in the Ukraine rather as the equivalent of the First Moroccan Crisis. An event that allowed for sabre rattling, raised fears of war, contributed to adversarial foreign policies - but it was in itself not the direct prelude to a great war.
Many writers write loose about 'national security', and I think it would help very much if we kept our minds more clear when discussing such topics.
There are three things to consider usually:
(1) being blockaded by sea or in the air
(2) being bombed
(3) being invaded/occupied
If the scare story isn't about any of these three, it shouldn't be considered relevant to national security.
Alliances can be purposeful for national security, and the criteria have to be applied to the treaty allies (within the treaties' definitions) for 'collective security'.
Very, very much hyperventilation, hyperbole, scaremongering, warmongering, wasteful spending and actual wars could be cut down or avoided if only we focused on these three criteria.
A miscreant government on a distant continent is almost never a national or collective security concern - but it might still be the target of extreme hyperventilation, hyperbole, hypocrisy, scaremongering, warmongering, wasteful spending and even be invaded for nothing, with thousands of dead (orders of magnitude more total loss of life) and trillions € wasted expenses.
"National security" debates and articles and the subcultures obsessing about navies, air power, armies depend on fuzzy definitions, unfounded assumptions and an absence of any cost-benefit analysis as do humans depend on oxygen. The emperors are truly without clothes once you cut through the nonsense and ask how a certain described (proposed) effort does avert or end any of the three points.
The last three German surface warship programs, for example: A corvette that's useless in warfare and excessively armed for coast guard-like jobs. A "frigate" with the same flaws, meant to do the same jobs farther away from port, and for longer. And now a program for yet another such useless piece of shit "built for, but not with" useful capabilities in wartime (such as anti-submarine equipment or true area air defence capability). Tragically, these ships were designed to inflict harm #1 on another country (naval blockade), albeit supposedly with a UN mandate. Such spending is not defence spending, not national security spending, not collective security spending - it's spending for bullying and extremely wasteful spending for maritime policing.
I have little doubt: At least parts of this law will crash in either their constitutional court or on the European level.
Still, this law fits into a pattern.
It's been common for politicians even in democratic, liberal countries to think of small parts of their own population as to be repressed, not to be represented. This was mostly about minorities (Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basques in Spain), criminal groups or political extremists (both far left and far right), but it feels to me as if this has changed.
It feels as if it's in fashion, Zeitgeist, for European governments to think of larger shares of their populations as to be repressed, and of everyone as a potential suspect. The mass surveillance, move towards authoritarian governance (most of all in Hungary), the repression of anti-financial sector demonstrations and the far-reaching "security" efforts at G7 and G8 meetings as well as submissiveness to "security" demands for certain visiting heads of state and certain embassies added to this perception.
It doesn't help much to nullify some of the repressive or mass surveillance laws in constitutional courts and to expose and criticize "security" overreach during multinational meetings.
The current seems to point towards more repression, more authoritarian governance - two steps towards, one step back, two steps towards, one step back ... the people lose their liberty this way if the affected societies in Europe don't begin to walk away from authoritarian tendencies for real.
The politicians don't understand what they're doing The power is in their hands, not in the hands of some caricature of an autocrat, right? Yet it doesn't matter who's in power; you're kept unfree if laws punish you for speaking out to power.
And that's where the current leads us. Read the links above if you have doubts about this.